Determining the appropriate level at which to set the exchange rate is a challenging problem for any country pursuing a managed or fixed exchange rate policy. Ideally, a country would set its exchange rate at the long-run equilibrium real rate, that is, the rate consistent with internal and external balance (the latter referring to balance between the current account and sustainable capital account flows). Even in relatively stable and mature industrial economies, however, the long-run equilibrium level of the real exchange rate is usually difficult to identify. In developing countries subject to macroeconomic instability or structural change, this identification is even more difficult. The determination of the equilibrium real exchange rate is especially uncertain if the economy is in the midst of trade liberalization and other reforms that promise to change previously existing relations between trade performance and the exchange rate.
12

The Use of the Parallel Market Rate as a Guide to Setting the Official Exchange Rate
Nita Ghei and Steven B. Kamin * Determining the appropriate level at which to set the exchange rate is a challenging problem for any country pursuing a managed or fixed exchange rate policy. Ideally, a country would set its exchange rate at the long-run equilibrium real rate, that is, the rate consistent with internal and external balance (the latter referring to balance between the current account and sustainable capital account flows). Even in relatively stable and mature industrial economies, however, the long-run equilibrium level of the real exchange rate is usually difficult to identify. In developing countries subject to macroeconomic instability or structural change, this identification is even more difficult. The determination of the equilibrium real exchange rate is especially uncertain if the economy is in the midst of trade liberalization and other reforms that promise to change previously existing relations between trade performance and the exchange rate. The issue of how to estimate long-run equilibrium real exchange rates has been addressed from a variety of different empirical perspectives by other chapters in this volume. This chapter rounds out that coverage by extending the analysis to a particular context not specifically considered elsewhere in this book: that of countries that maintain multiple exchange rate arrangements. Such arrangements, formal and informal, legal and illegal, were the norm for developing countries until very recently. Even though an increasing number of countries have unified their exchange rates, often as part of a larger liberalization effort, parallel foreign exchange markets have not disappeared as yet. Nigeria, which has never successfully unified its exchange rate, is a prominent example in Africa. In Venezuela, which unified its exchange rate in 1989, a parallel market emerged in 1994 following the reimposition of capital controls. Because parallel exchange rates continue to exist in important countries and because specific analytical issues in estimating the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate (LRER) that do not arise in the context of unified rates present themselves in this case, the implications of parallel rates merit separate attention.
The key question to be addressed in this context is the extent to which the free exchange rate in a parallel exchange market can provide guidance in identifying the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. In cases in which a parallel market for foreign exchange exists, it may appear natural to consider the parallel exchange rate as a proxy for the "underlying" equilibrium real exchange rate-that is, the rate that would tend to prevail over the long run in a unified exchange market. This interpretation suggests itself because the parallel exchange rate usually has the benefit of being determined in a free market and hence may not appear to be obviously contaminated by the distortionary effects of government policy.
Notwithstanding the appeal of a parallel market determined exchange rate as a guide to setting the official exchange rate, however, we will argue that various factors complicate the relationship between the parallel market rate and the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. First, while the parallel market for foreign exchange may not itself be controlled by the government, conditions in that market are likely to be affected by government policy. Relative supplies and demands for foreign currency in the parallel market will be altered by the level of the official exchange rate, the extent to which exchange and trade controls are enforced, and the government's formula for rationing foreign exchange receipts to importers. Second, because the parallel exchange market represents an asset market as well as a trade-related market, the parallel market rate is likely to reflect expectations, political concerns, capital flight, and other speculative factors not directly associated with the equilibrium real exchange rate. Hence, only under a relatively narrow set of circumstances may the parallel market rate serve as a useful guide to determining the equilibrium value of the official exchange rate.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The following section on the essential characteristics of parallel exchange markets provides the requisite background information on multiple exchange rate arrange-ments. It also defines parallel exchange markets more precisely and describes their key characteristics. 1 In the subsequent section we review a simple theoretical model of parallel exchange markets to shed light on how parallel exchange rates are determined in relation to both official exchange rates and equilibrium exchange rates. Then comes a section that brings some empirical evidence to bear on the analysis, comparing the evolution of parallel and official real exchange rates over time to provide a feel for the applicability of the theoretical results derived in the previous section. The final section summarizes the chapter's analytical and empirical findings concerning the relation between the parallel exchange rate and the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate.
Essential Characteristics of Parallel Exchange Markets
This background section sets out the essential characteristics of parallel exchange markets. It begins by defining more precisely what we mean by a parallel exchange market and describing its key features. The section then considers alternative ways in which governments have managed parallel markets, distinguishing broadly between the Latin American and African models. The section concludes with a review of trends in parallel markets in the 1990s.
Basic Concepts
A parallel foreign exchange market system is one in which transactions take place at more than one exchange rate and at least one of the prevailing rates is a freely floating, market-determined rate (the parallel exchange rate).
2 Parallel market systems represent a subset of the broader category of multiple exchange rate regimes, which refer to any regimes in which two or more exchange rates are applied to the same currency. Many developing countries have applied separate, fixed exchange rates to different types of transactions, but this practice is, in essence, equivalent to a single exchange rate coupled with different taxes or subsidies (depending on the transaction). By contrast, a parallel market for foreign exchange is distinguished by the fact that the parallel exchange rate is determined freely in the market. Usually, the official exchange rate in parallel market systems is pegged by the authorities at a particular 1. For general surveys of the issues associated with parallel markets for foreign exchange, see Agenor (1992) and Kiguel and O'Connell (1995) .
2. Kiguel and O'Connell (1995) .
fixed (or crawling) rate, although in principle the official rate could be floating as well. Additionally, it is frequently-although not alwaysthe case that the official exchange rate applies to current account transactions, while the parallel market rate, whether legal or illegal, applies to capital account transactions. Parallel markets for foreign exchange can emerge only when the government imposes exchange controls, that is, restrictions on the volume of certain foreign exchange transactions or on the price at which such transactions are made. Trade barriers, quantitative restrictions, or high tariffs alone are not in themselves sufficient to give rise to a parallel exchange market. While such controls may affect the demand or supply of foreign currencies, they will not drive a wedge between exchange rates for different transactions as long as foreign exchange is freely available for all transactions at an official or market-determined exchange rate. A parallel market arises when the government limits the amount of foreign exchange that can be bought or sold for particular transactions, causing excess demand or supply to spill over into a parallel market, or authorizes that exchange rates for certain transactions be pegged and for other transactions be floating.
Parallel exchange rate systems may be legal or illegal. When the parallel market for foreign exchange is legal, it is often referred to as a dual exchange rate (DER) system. In these cases, most current account transactions take place at a pegged commercial rate, and capital account transactions at a market-determined financial rate. A number of countries have experimented with DER systems of varying duration. Some countries maintained official dual exchange rates for long time periods, such as Belgium (from 1957 to 1990 ) and the Dominican Republic (until 1993) . The parallel market in these countries was used to insulate the rest of the economy from short-term capital flows. France (1971-74) and Italy (1973-74) adopted dual rates for a short period following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system as a transitory measure. Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela adopted DER regimes in the 1980s in the wake of balanceof-payments crises and huge capital outflows.
Illegal parallel market systems emerge when private agents attempt to evade restrictions on the price or quantity of foreign exchange transactions. Illegal parallel markets were the norm in most of Africa and South Asia, as well as in several Latin American countries, especially through the 1980s. The authorities, with some exceptions, generally tolerated the parallel markets. For example, the threat of enforcement and penalties was significant in Ghana before 1983, but these efforts fell by the wayside later on, and the coverage of the parallel market grew, as did the parallel premium (Kiguel and O'Connell, 1995) . In Sudan, trading on the parallel market was a capital offense, and enforcement was attempted between 1970 and 1990. But even the threat of capital punishment did not totally wipe out the parallel market, though it may have been a factor in the very high premium observed in Sudan.
In principle, there is little difference, in terms of macroeconomic implications, between legal and illegal systems. In either case, free-market transactions in foreign exchange take place alongside controlled price transactions. In either legal or illegal systems, there are incentives for transactions to spill over or "leak" from one market into the other. These leakages may tend to undermine the dual exchange rate systems, depending upon how rigidly exchange controls are enforced.
Observers frequently view the incidence of restrictions on international transactions as evidence of the prevalence and importance of parallel exchange markets. According to IMF reports, about one-half of the member countries impose restrictions on payments on transaction on the current account; more than three-quarters do so on capital account payments (See table 12.1). However, the mere existence of restrictions does not necessarily imply the existence of significant parallel markets since the IMF data are qualitative, with only two values (yes and no), and so do not capture either the intensity of restrictions or the effectiveness of their enforcement. Therefore, considering the existence of payments restrictions alone would result in an overestimate of the prevalence of parallel markets for foreign exchange. In fact, only 46 (33 percent) out of the 138 countries in table 12.1 having some form of payments restrictions in 1994 actually had parallel market premiums exceeding 15 percent in that year. Of these 46 countries, 40 had restrictions on both current and capital account transactions, with the other 6 having restrictions only on capital account transactions. Of the 46 countries with significant parallel premiums, 20 were in Africa, 14 were socialist or formerly socialist economies, and the other 12 were in Latin America, Asia, or the Middle East. Parallel markets are likely to be unimportant, and the parallel premium low, when payments restrictions and capital controls are either minimal or not enforced. For example, South Africa imposed capital controls in 1985, following massive capital outflows, and reintroduced a dual exchange rate system at that time. But the parallel premium has remained modest enough-the median premium was 4.4 percent for 3. Comprehensive data on parallel exchange rates used to be published in Pick's World Currency Yearbook and by its successor, International Currency Analysis, Inc. However, since these ceased publication in the mid-1990s, no single public source of comprehensive data on parallel rates after 1994 has been readily available. Data on parallel rates now have to be obtained on an ad hoc countryby-country basis from whatever official or unofficial sources may be available.
the period 1980-89 and declined to 2.3 percent during the period 1990-94 (Ghei, Kiguel, and O'Connell 1996) -that South Africa would be considered to have a unified exchange rate regime under the definition adopted in the section below on trends in official and parallel real exchange rates. There are several other examples of countries that have had extremely low premiums, including Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, with median premiums varying from -1.5 to 3.4 per cent (Ghei, Kiguel, and O'Connell 1996) .
Management of Parallel Markets
Parallel market systems emerge for different reasons in different countries. There is one legitimate rationale for a system in which current account transactions are conducted at a pegged rate and capital account transactions are conducted at a floating rate: to insulate domestic prices and economic activity from exchange rate fluctuations deriving from transitory shocks in the financial market.
In practice, the implementation of parallel market systems in developing countries rarely has been consistent with this rationale. In certain Latin American countries, dual exchange rate systems were indeed adopted in response to strong, temporary capital outflows resulting from balance-of-payments crises in the 1980s. These did, to a certain extent, protect their economies from excessive, transitory depreciations of the exchange rate. There was very little rationing in the official market for trade transactions, as foreign exchange supply was usually enough to satisfy demand. On average, the premium of the parallel rate relative to the official rate was quite moderate in these cases-though there were occasional spikes when the premium was very high. But these spikes reflected temporary macroeconomic crises, not a drastic and persistent misalignment of the real exchange rate. However, these dual market arrangements were retained long after the financial crises had passed. Moreover, even after the crises had passed, the parallel rates continued to be more depreciated than the official rates. In a dual rate system designed to protect an economy from exchange rate variability-as opposed to a system designed to target the official rate at a level persistently more appreciated than the one that the market would set-the parallel rate would be expected to fluctuate both above and below the official rate. In African countries, parallel markets were even less consistent with the one legitimate rationale for maintaining a dual rate system. In these countries, exchange controls were frequently tightened as progressive overvaluation of the official exchange rate led to excess demand for foreign exchange at the official rate. This tightening, in turn, led to the creation of parallel markets to evade exchange controls, even in the absence of strong capital account pressures. Hence, exchange controls were used to prop up persistently misaligned official exchange rates, not to insulate the domestic economy from transitory fluctuations. In the prototypical case, foreign exchange rationing grew more stringent over time as the official exchange rate became increasingly overvalued. Importers who lacked access to ever scarcer foreign exchange through the official channels turned to the parallel market to obtain foreign exchange for trade transactions. The parallel premium grew to very high levels, and stayed there, as the official rate became more and more overvalued. In Ghana, which is the textbook example of this phenomenon, the official exchange rate was so overvalued by the end of the 1980s that it became irrelevant for most transactions; even domestic prices and inflation reflected the parallel, not the official rate (Chhibber and Shaffik, 1991) .
Parallel Markets in the 1990s
Although a great many countries have experimented with parallel exchange arrangements at various times, the incidence of such arrangements has been declining in the 1990s, since an increasing number of developing countries have sought to unify their exchange rates, often as part of a larger structural reform effort, which includes liberalization of the external accounts. The breakup of the former Soviet Union temporarily added a number of new countries that initially had parallel exchange markets. However, the trend among the new transition economies has also been toward unification (Halpern and Wyplosz 1997) .
Observers have identified various negative consequences of exchange controls and the parallel markets that they engender. A nonexhaustive list would include, first, the fact that exchange controls allow the authorities to maintain a persistently misaligned official exchange rateperhaps coupled with inappropriate fiscal, monetary, and commercial policies-without losing all their international reserves, thereby distorting relative prices in the economy and inhibiting the growth of exports. Second, because parallel market regimes often involve the rationing of foreign exchange at subsidized rates to those with preferential access to the authorities, exchange controls encourage the development of rentseeking behavior among private entrepreneurs. Finally, the introduction of exchange controls, which by their nature are hard to enforce and profitable to evade, tends to promote a culture of law evasion among private entrepreneurs that may spill over into other areas such as tax compliance or adherence to other economic and financial regulations.
In response to these and other adverse effects of exchange controls, many countries have moved to dismantle exchange controls and unify their exchange markets. Parallel exchange rate arrangements are now found in developing countries only; Belgium, which was the last developed country with dual exchange rates, moved to a unified exchange rate in 1990. Some parallel markets were abandoned either because they were no longer needed (for example, when the crisis that led to them ended) or because they were no longer effective (for example, when rampant evasion of exchange controls undermined the dual exchange rate system). Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela had legal dual rates that were expected to be temporary. All three created dual rates and then unified within the period 1980 to 1994, though a parallel market did re-emerge in Venezuela in 1994, as discussed above. Other Latin American countries moved to multiple rates or unified within the same period. In the African and Asian countries, in contrast, parallel markets have tended to be more long lived. A few of these countries unified their exchange rates in the 1990s. Others (including Tanzania, Ghana, and India) moved to legalize their parallel markets as a transitional measure while easing restrictions on current account transactions-as a step on the path to unification of the exchange rate. In those cases, unification has been part of a larger structural reform effort aimed at liberalizing markets overall.
However, the trend toward unification has not been universal. Major exceptions remain-mostly in Africa, including Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia. To assess the extent to which the survival of parallel markets has been more widespread, we gathered data on the official and parallel exchange rates for a sample of 24 developing countries listed in table 12.2. 4 Our sample includes countries in which significant parallel markets existed for some time. It includes most of the more important 4. The sample is drawn from the World Bank research project on the macroeconomic implications of multiple exchange rates in developing countries, the findings of which are reported in Kiguel, Lizondo, and O'Connell (1996) . The basic data set used here is from Ghei and Kiguel (1992) . We added three African countries-Algeria, Malawi, and Sudan-and extended the data set to the end developing countries outside Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. The sample is otherwise fairly representative geographically, with 11 countries from Latin America, 10 from Africa, 2 from South Asia, and Turkey. Parallel exchange rates were still present in half of these countries at the end of 1994 (see table 12.2).
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The evolution over time of the official and parallel real exchange rates in the sample group of countries is shown in figure 12.1.a and 12.1.b. The level of the parallel premium has decreased, on average, in the countries that have retained parallel exchange rate arrangements. For a selected group of high-premium countries, Ghei, Kiguel, and O'Connell (1996) find that the median premium for the period 1990 to 1994 was 49 percent, compared with a figure of 100 per cent for the period 1980 to 1989.
6 Similar trends have been observed for moderate and low-premium countries as well. For our sample, we find lower premiums in 1994 relative to 1985 in many cases.
Overall, then, there are indications that developing countries are moving in the direction of unified exchange rates. The number of countries with significant parallel markets has declined, and the gap between the official and the parallel rate is steadily decreasing in most of the countries that still have parallel rates. Nonetheless, parallel exchange rates continue to exist in a significant number of developing countries around the world.
A Simple Model of Parallel Exchange Rate Determination
As we have just seen, unification of parallel exchange markets has been on the policy agenda of many developing countries in recent years. When the unification of parallel exchange rates is intended to result in a single exchange rate that is officially determined-as is generally the casethe authorities will need to identify the long-run equilibrium value of the real exchange rate, and, as noted in the introduction, this task will of 1994, the last year for which consistent data are available as explained in footnote 3. A number of transition economies also had parallel rates in 1994 but were not part of the sample studied.
5. However, documenting the trend toward unification, parallel exchange rate arrangements had been even more widespread in developing countries in the 1980s-every country in our sample had more than one exchange rate in 1985.
6. A high-premium country is one in which the median premium exceeds 50 percent. The term "moderate premium" is applied to countries with a median premium between 10 percent and 50 percent. A median level of less than 10 percent puts a country into the low-premium category. The time period examined is 1970-94. be fraught with considerable uncertainty. Under these circumstances, the prevailing preunification parallel exchange rate appears as an obvious proxy for the postunification equilibrium rate, and the authorities might naturally consider the parallel rate to be an appropriate target toward which to move the official rate, either gradually or all at once. However, there are many factors that could cause the parallel rate to diverge significantly from the long-run equilibrium value of a unified rate, making it, in many instances, an inappropriate target for the official exchange rate. 1970 1973 Q4 1978 Q4 1983 Q4 1988 Q4 1993 Q4 Chile 0 1970 1973 Q4 1978 Q4 1983 Q4 1988 Q4 1993 Q4 Note: Quarterly figures with year marking fourth quarter. An upward movement is a depreciation of the RER. 1970 1973 Q4 1978 Q4 1983 Q4 1988 Q4 1993 Q4 To develop this argument, this section presents a simple partialequilibrium model to illustrate how the parallel market exchange rate is determined in relation both to the official exchange rate and to the longrun equilibrium exchange rate-that is, the rate that would produce equilibrium in the balance of payments under normal, sustainable policy conditions. 7 There is no consensus regarding the most appropriate model to use in explaining the parallel market rate, just as there is no agreement as to which model best explains the movement of floating exchange rates among industrial countries. The model illustrated below has the advantage of being relatively straightforward and intuitive, while hopefully highlighting the most important features influencing the parallel market rate.
Basic Setup
Consider a small open economy trading in two goods, a nondomestically consumed export good and a nondomestically produced import; the world prices of both goods are fixed and set to unity. To focus on developments in the external sector, we assume it to be small relative to the domestic economy, so that the analysis describes the operation of the parallel exchange market in partial equilibrium. Therefore, the output of a nontraded good and its price are considered fixed as well. We assume for convenience that the U.S. dollar is the only foreign currency traded.
Turning to the parameters of government policy, it is assumed that monetary and fiscal policies are at their long-run, sustainable levels, and moreover, for analytical convenience, that there are no tariffs, subsidies, or other commercial policy interventions. (The role of import barriers will be examined later.) The official exchange rate E (measured in terms of domestic currency per dollar) is pegged at an overvalued level relative to the equilibrium rate. Therefore, at that level of the exchange rate, the flow demand for U.S. dollars (to be elaborated below) exceeds their flow supply. Unlike other models considered in this book, we assume here that the overvaluation is supported by foreign exchange rationing-that is, exporters are required to surrender their dollar earnings to the central bank at the official rate E, and the central bank rations dollar sales to importers, restricting them to the amount OS, based on the amount of export revenues surrendered to the central bank OX, according to a central bank rationing function as shown in equation 12.1: (12.1) 7. The model and its exposition are based on the analysis presented in Kamin (1993 Kamin ( , 1995 .
OS = OS OX , OS > ¢
Private capital flows are assumed to take place in the parallel market with the central bank supplying foreign exchange only for imports to the official market. In response to the prevailing excess demand for dollars at the official rate E, a parallel market for dollars priced at the parallel market rate E p emerges. We follow the conventional stock-flow approach to exchange rate determination in positing that in the long run, the parallel rate moves so as to equate flow demands for dollars by importers with flow supplies for dollars by exporters. That is, in the long run E p is set so as to balance the private sector's current account. In the short run, in contrast, the parallel market rate is assumed to move exclusively to set the portfolio demand for dollars equal to the stock of dollars outstanding, so that at any given moment the private current account may be out of balance.
The Equilibrium Parallel Market Rate
We now analyze the determination of the parallel market rate when the private current is in account equilibrium. The private-sector current account is defined as the difference between private dollar inflows or supplies, S, and outflows or demands, D. We assume that foreigners hold no domestic assets, so that changes in the stock of dollars held by the private sector, B, occur exclusively through imbalances in the private sector's current account, as shown by equation 12.2:
The current account (or flow) demand for dollars is a derived demand for imported goods. Arbitrage ensures that the price of the import will be the same, whether purchased from a legal importer with access to official foreign exchange or from a smuggler using dollars purchased in the parallel market. 8 In either case, the price of imports will be set equal to its marginal cost, the parallel market rate E p (since by assumption, the foreign-currency price is set to unity). Therefore, the private demand for imports, as indicated in equation 12.3 below, depends (negatively) upon the domestic currency price of imports E p relative to the price of nontradables P n . 9 8. We assume that there are no tariffs and that restrictions on smuggling are evaded at no cost. The latter assumption is relaxed below.
9. In principle, import demand is a function of income as well. Since, in this partial equilibrium model, income is considered to be fixed, we do not include it explicitly in the demand function.
where e p is the real parallel exchange rate. The current account (or flow) supply of dollars derives both from underinvoiced dollar earnings-that is, export receipts not turned over to the central bank-and from official dollar sales to importers, OS. Note that while holders of import licenses have an incentive to overinvoice, this does not add to the total supply of dollars to the private sector, which is fixed by the central bank's rationing function (equation 12.1). Let X represent the quantity of total exports and total dollar revenues as well (since the world price is set to unity), while f represents the share of total export proceeds diverted to the parallel market. Then, as shown by equation 12.4:
Exporters maximize domestic-currency profits subject to rising marginal costs of production-which we assume to be related to the price of nontraded goods-as well as rising costs associated with the underinvoicing share f. We can derive the supply curve for total exports as a function of the weighted average of the real (nontradables price deflated) official (e) and parallel (e 
p D e = X +OS OX f international reserves. Therefore, we can assume that over a long time period, the central bank will resell all surrendered export receipts OX = (1 -f)X to licensed importers, after it extracts any foreign exchange needs of the government (assumed to be invariant to the exchange rate), D ; its location also is a function of e, since both e p and e affect the total quantity of exports supplied. The variable e* is the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. It is the level of the real exchange rate that would clear the market (that is, set total demands for foreign exchange equal to total supplies) in a unified foreign exchange market. Note that when the official exchange rate is set equal to e*, the parallel rate also must equal e*.
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In other words, when the official exchange rate is set at its equilibrium value, there is no current account motive for the emergence of a parallel foreign exchange market, since there is no excess demand for foreign exchange at the official rate. We now consider the effects on the real parallel rate of a real appreciation of the official rate. Assume that the authorities allow the official rate e to appreciate to an overvalued level e 1 < e*. Because this lowers the profitability of exports, the supply curve SS shifts inward, creating an excess demand for foreign exchange at that rate. This puts upward pressure on the foreign exchange value of the dollar in the (now emergent) parallel market, causing the parallel exchange rate to depreciate from e* to e p 1 . 13 Hence, in cases in which the emergence of the parallel market reflects the overvaluation of the official commercial exchange rate, the parallel 11. This formulation is consistent with the assumptions in Sheik (1976) and Nowak (1984) .
12. This equality must hold because if D(e*) = X(e*) -Dg in a unified exchange market and if in a parallel market system D(ep) = X( fep + (1 -f )e*) -Dg, then it is obvious by inspection that the second equation is satisfied for ep =e*.
13. This result is consistent with that found by Nowak (1984) .
.
market rate, on average, is likely to be more depreciated not only than the commercial rate but probably also than the long-run equilibrium exchange rate. Various factors are likely to determine the extent to which the parallel rate is more depreciated than the equilibrium exchange rate. As figure 12.2 makes obvious, the more overvalued the official exchange rate-and so the greater the extent to which the SS curve shifts inwardthe greater will be the gap between the parallel rate and the equilibrium rate. It also is straightforward to show that the more elastic exports are and the less elastic imports are with respect to the exchange rate, the greater the gap will be. The extent to which export surrender requirements are enforced plays a key role in determining the value of the parallel exchange rate as well. Recall that total exports are a function of a weighted average of the real official and parallel exchange rates. If foreign exchange regulations are tightly enforced, underinvoicing of exports will be limited, reducing the underinvoicing ratio f and thereby increasing the weight placed on the official exchange rate. In this case, the overvaluation of the official exchange rate depresses total exports significantly, reducing the supply of foreign exchange to the parallel market, and depreciating the real parallel market exchange rate substantially relative to the equilibrium rate.
Conversely, if foreign exchange regulations are poorly enforced and widely evaded, the underinvoicing ratio will be higher, the weighted average exchange rate will be more favorable for exporters, and total exports will not be as severely depressed. This will lead to less pressure on the parallel market exchange rate and a smaller gap relative to the equilibrium rate. At an extreme, as to some extent occurred in some African countries, the official exchange rate becomes so widely evaded that it becomes irrelevant to most economic decisions. In this context, most trade is routed through the underground economy, and the parallel exchange rate may become a reasonably accurate guide to the longrun equilibrium rate. Finally, the value of the parallel exchange rate in long-run equilibrium is likely to be influenced by the extent to which short-run barriers to imports (above and beyond merely rationing official sales of foreign exchange through exchange controls) are enforced.
14 The above analysis assumes that once importers acquire foreign exchange, whether officially or from the black market, they may use that financing to freely import goods. However, if the authorities temporarily impose high import barriers and the barriers are well enforced so that smuggling is costly, these barriers will reduce the demand for foreign exchange in the black market-that is, the DD curve shown in figure 12.2 will shift inward and to the left. This reduced demand, in turn, would cause the real parallel exchange rate to appreciate relative to the long-run equilibrium value of the real exchange rate. For sufficiently tight controls on imports, the real parallel rate could even be more appreciated than the long-run equilibrium real rate.
The Parallel Market Rate in Short-Run Portfolio Equilibrium
The results described above are likely, at best, to hold on average over relatively long periods of time. In the very short term, the stock of dollars held by the private sector is considered to be fixed, since it takes time to accumulate or dissipate dollars through current account imbalances. During this short run, the parallel market rate, at which all private capital flows are assumed to take place, is conventionally modeled as being determined by the portfolio-based demand for dollars. This portfolio demand depends upon the relative expected rates of return to holding dollars and domestic assets-which are influenced by anticipated inflation, other aspects of macroeconomic performance, and political events as well. The volatility of such expectations largely explains 14. We consider the case of short-run barriers only, since these leave the longrun equilibrium real exchange rate e* unchanged. the high volatility exhibited by most freely floating exchange rates, including parallel market exchange rates.
For a simple theoretical exposition, assume that private-sector agents hold two assets in their portfolio, dollars and domestic currency. Following Dornbusch and others (1983), the desired ratio of the domesticcurrency value of private-sector dollar holdings to the nominal domestic money supply (M) is modeled as a function of the expected rate of depreciation of the black market rate (the ^ denotes percentage change), as shown in equation 12.10: The notation for the rate of depreciation, Ê p , omits an expectational term to reflect the assumption of perfect foresight. The portfolio demand for dollars (when the parallel market rate is stable) traces out a downwardsloping curve in (e p , B) space as shown in figure 12.3. Given that B is considered fixed at any one moment, the level of B determines the level of e p at that moment. In the long run, the parallel market rate and the private stock of dollar holdings are determined by the requirements of both portfolio and current account equilibrium. In addition to the portfolio equilibrium condition described above, figure 12.3 depicts the locus of points for which the private current account is in equilibrium, so that the stock of dollars (B) held by the private sector is unchanging. This curve, denoted dB = 0, is vertical, since for any given official exchange rate, a single value of the parallel market rate e p clears the private current account.
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The point where the two curves cross-the steady-state equilibrium-is 15. For simplicity, this analysis abstracts from the interest payments associated with net asset holdings, as well as from the wealth effects of asset holdings on import demand. In the presence of interest payments or wealth effects, the dB = 0 curve would not be vertical, since the value of the parallel market exchange rate that cleared the private current account would depend upon the stock of dollar holdings B.(
the only point at which both the current account is in equilibrium and the stock of dollars held by the private sector equals its portfolio demand. Finally, the vertical and horizontal arrows represent the direction of movement of B and e p outside of equilibrium, while the diagonal line-the "stable saddle path"-indicates the path by which B and e p converge toward equilibrium, should they start out outside of equilibrium.
We now consider the effects on the parallel market rate of a rise in inflation-for example, from 0 to 20 percent-leading to higher rates of nominal depreciation of the official and parallel exchange rates. This example is an important one because many countries that imposed exchange controls experienced increases in inflation and other measures of macroeconomic volatility at about the same time, particularly in Latin America (and Turkey).
As shown in figure 12 .4, the increased expected level of inflationand hence of nominal depreciation of the parallel market rate-leads agents to desire to hold a higher ratio of dollars to domestic currency, causing the portfolio balance curve to shift upward. Equilibrium dollar holdings shift from B 0 to B 1 , while the equilibrium real parallel market rate remains unchanged. However, in order to accumulate additional dollars, the private current account must shift into surplus temporarily, which in turn requires a temporary depreciation of the real parallel exchange rate. Hence, at the moment of increased inflation expectations,
Figure 12.3 Current Account and Portfolio Equilibrium in the Parallel Market
Note: An increase in e p is a depreciation.
the parallel market rate jumps from initial equilibrium at (1) to the new stable saddle path at (2). After this, the accumulation of dollars through the current account surplus reverses the depreciation of the real parallel market rate until the system returns to equilibrium at (3). In the example depicted above, the real parallel exchange rate becomes, for a time, more depreciated than its own equilibrium level, conditional on the value of the real official rate. (As a result of these temporary capital outflows, the short-run equilibrium exchange rate in a unified market also would depreciate relative to its long-run equilibrium level.) Since the equilibrium level of the parallel exchange rate is likely (as shown above in the previous subsection) to be more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium rate in a unified exchange market, the accumulation of dollar balances during periods of macroeconomic volatility and capital outflows will cause the parallel rate to be even more depreciated at such times. Hence, during periods of macroeconomic volatility and heavy capital outflows, the parallel rate is likely to be a particularly biased guide to setting the appropriate level of the official exchange rate.
In fact, because of the asset market function of the parallel exchange market, the parallel market rate can trade at a large premium over the official rate, even when the official rate is close to its long-run equilibrium value-that is, the value that equilibrates the balance of payments in "normal" macroeconomic circumstances. As noted above, during periods of heavy capital outflows the short-run equilibrium real exchange
(1)
Figure 12.4 Effect of Increased Inflation on the Parallel Exchange Rate
rate in a unified exchange market may depreciate relative to its longrun level. If the official exchange rate remains at its equilibrium longrun level, a temporary excess demand for foreign exchange will develop that will cause a parallel market premium to emerge. The Latin American countries' experiences with exchange controls may fit this scenario. As will be discussed further below, in several of these countries a combination of factors led to a balance-of-payments crisis in the 1980s. The governments responded to this crisis by depreciating the official exchange rate, but because of the size of the capital outflows triggered by the crises, the parallel market rates in these countries depreciated still further. Finally, we should underscore the fact that even if the real parallel market exchange rate, on average over long periods of time, were a good indicator of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, the value of the real parallel market rate at any single point in time would likely be an extremely unreliable proxy for that equilibrium rate. This is because the parallel market exchange rate, like any other asset price, depends upon highly volatile portfolio demands, and hence is itself highly volatile. This volatility may be seen quite easily in the figures showing the official and parallel exchange rates at the end of this chapter. Hence, aside from the fact that the parallel rate is likely to be a biased indicator of the long-run equilibrium exchange rate, it is also-unless averaged over very long periods-likely to be a highly volatile and inaccurate indicator of the equilibrium rate as well.
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Trends in Official and Parallel Real Exchange Rates
The theoretical model described above suggests that the parallel exchange rate is likely to be more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate unless (a) macroeconomic factors inducing capital flight are not present, (b) exchange controls are poorly enforced, or (c) there are high import barriers that are well enforced. To evaluate these hypotheses, we would, ideally, compare the path of the parallel exchange rate in various countries to that of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate in order to gauge the extent to which the parallel rate 16. On the basis of an optimizing model of the parallel market exchange rate, Montiel and Ostry (1994) come to much the same conclusion. They find that in the transition between steady-state equilibria in response to a productivity shock, the parallel market premium may move both above and below zero, and hence is "an unreliable indicator of the sign and magnitude of real exchange rate misalignment." may serve as a useful guide to determining the equilibrium exchange rate and, therefore, in setting the official rate.
Unfortunately, the equilibrium real exchange rate is a theoretical construct that must be estimated, not a directly measurable quantity for which data exist. Moreover, even in a unified market, the empirical estimation of the equilibrium real exchange rate is no easy task. Estimating the equilibrium rate is a highly involved process requiring strong assumptions about the operation of the current and capital accounts, as well as the estimation of stable trade and payments relationships over time.
Estimation of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate for a wide set of countries, in order to compare those exchange rates to actual parallel rates, would go beyond the limited scope of this chapter. As a first step toward identifying where parallel market rates stand in relation to long-run equilibrium real exchange rates, however, it makes sense to compare levels of the parallel rate to levels of the official rate, averaged over long periods of time. This comparison may be informative, since over sufficiently long periods, the balance of payments must on average be at a sustainable level. Additionally, it may be useful to compare the level of the real official exchange rate during periods in which exchange controls are in effect-and hence parallel markets exist-to periods during which exchange markets are unified. Such comparisons may shed light on the factors that motivated the imposition of exchange controls, which in turn may have implications for the relationship between the parallel and equilibrium real exchange rates.
A complicating factor in using averages of actual exchange rates as proxies for equilibrium exchange rates is that for most countries, the process of development and structural change will cause the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate to change over time. 17 In that sense, a long-period average of actual real exchange rates may yield, at best, an average of long-run real equilibrium exchange rates over that period. With this caveat in mind, however, we still believe that empirical comparisons of actual official and parallel exchange rates can yield useful insights.
First, our analysis will focus on averages of exchange rates across a large set of different countries. Therefore, even if long-run real equilibrium exchange rates follow particular trends in each individual country, the average long-run real equilibrium exchange rate for the sample as a whole may be more stationary. Second, our analysis focuses upon 17. This problem is in essence the one, highlighted in Chapters 5 and 7 of this book, of using PPP-based estimates of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate when the real exchange rate proves to be nonstationary.
comparison of different types of exchange rates-official and parallelduring regimes with and without exchange controls. Therefore, our results will be vulnerable to misinterpretation if the timing of exchange control periods in the sample coincide with particular movements in long-run equilibrium real exchange rates. While we believe, as discussed above, that exchange control periods are likely to coincide with systematic movements in short-run equilibrium real exchange rates, as a result of temporary shocks to capital flows or the terms of trade we have less cause to believe that exchange controls have been associated with particular trends in long-run equilibrium real exchange rates.
Methodology
Our statistical analysis is based on the 24-country sample described in the first section of this chapter on the essential characteristics of parallel exchange markets. To meaningfully compare levels of exchange rates in these countries over time, we first corrected the nominal (parallel and official) exchange rate data for changes in prices by calculating real exchange rates. There are a number of different empirical definitions of the real exchange rate as set out in Part I of this volume. Here we use the bilateral real exchange rate between the country that we are examining and the United States (units of local currency per U.S. dollar so that an increase in the exchange rate indicates a depreciation). The consumer price index (CPI) is used as a proxy for domestic prices, and the U.S. producer price index is used for world prices.
(12.12) where e is the real exchange rate; E, the nominal exchange rate, is the local-currency value of U.S. dollar; P US is the U.S. producer price index; and P is the domestic CPI.
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The data used are end-of-quarter, for the period from 1970 through 1994. The real official exchange rate is indexed so that its value in the first quarter of 1985 is equal to 100. The real parallel market exchange rate is indexed so that its value in the first quarter of 1985 is equal to 100 plus the premium (in percent) of the parallel rate over the official rate in 18. It is possible that the use of a bilateral exchange rate, using the U.S. producer price index as a proxy for world prices, may bias our results, in view of the significant movements of the U.S. dollar relative to the currencies of other industrial countries during the 1980s. Results of tests for sensitivity with respect to choice of foreign price index are presented in the appendix for a subsample of countries for the period 1979-94.
US E P e = P
◊ that base quarter. For each country, the mean and median average values are calculated for the following: e, the official real exchange rate for the entire period; e p , the parallel real exchange rate for the entire period of its existence, that is, when exchange controls were in effect; e nu , the nonunified official real exchange rate for the periods when exchange controls were in effect and exchange markets were not unified; and e u , the unified official real exchange rate during periods, if any existed, when exchange markets were unified. A unification of exchange markets is defined to have taken place if the absolute value of the parallel rate deviates by less than 3 percent from the official rate for at least four quarters. The nonzero number is to take into account measurement errors, since the official and parallel rates are from different sources (see tables).
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A cross-country summary of our calculations of the four real exchange rate categories described above, based on mean averages of the exchange rate data for each separate country, is presented in columns 1 through 4 of table 12.3. Results are presented in table 12.3 for the whole sample, as well as two subsets. For the countries in each subset, we present the mean, median, and standard deviation of the real exchange rate. In columns 5 though 9 of table 12.3, we calculate various ratios of the data shown in columns 1 through 4, and perform binomial sign tests to determine whether these ratios differ significantly from one. The "Pr (H 0 is true)" row indicates the probability that the observed configuration of ratios would be observed, if the null hypothesis-that the ratio is equal to 1-were true.
The regional groupings were chosen in order to test our hypotheses concerning the different motivation and function of parallel markets in different regions set out above in the section on the essential characteristics of parallel markets. In Latin America and Turkey, exchange controls were imposed, particularly in the 1980s, in situations of macroeconomic and balance-of-payments crisis leading to strong capital outflows. In these countries, pressures from capital flight are likely to have caused the parallel rate to depreciate well above the long-run equilibrium real rate, even if the official exchange rate was not especially overvalued relative to its long-run equilibrium value. African and South Asian countries, in contrast, experienced much less macroeconomic distress. In those countries, exchange controls were more likely to have arisen as a means of rationing foreign exchange receipts in the context of a progressive overvaluation of the official exchange rate. As described in the subsection above on the equilibrium parallel market rate, the parallel rate is n.a n.a n.a n.a 0 3 0 0 3 Number > 1 n.a n.a n.a n.a 12 9 12 12 9 Pr (H 0 is true) n.a n.a n.a n. n.a n.a n.a n.a 0 12 0 3 5 Number > 1 n.a n.a n.a n.a 12 0 12 2 0 Pr (H 0 is true) n.a n.a n.a n. n.a n.a n.a n.a 0 15 0 3 8 Number > 1 n.a n.a n.a n.a 24 9 24 14 9 Pr (H 0 is true) n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.006 0.500 likely to be more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium rate in this context as well, unless exchange controls are poorly enforced or wellenforced import barriers effectively curtail the demand for foreign exchange.
Comparisons of Period Averages
We now compare the real parallel rate e p to various proxies of the equilibrium real exchange rate. The first possible proxy for the equilibrium RER we consider is e, the average RER for a period of 25 years. As may be seen in column 5, e p /e, on average, is greater than 1, with a mean of 1.64 for the entire sample. In fact, there is no country in our sample for which the average real parallel market exchange rate was more appreciated than the average real official rate (calculated for periods in which the exchange market was unified as well as nonunified). To the extent that the average official rate, when averaged over a sufficiently long period, is a good proxy for the equilibrium real rate, this suggests that the parallel rate is a biased indicator of the equilibrium rate.
However, using the average RER for the entire period may be misleading, since it includes periods with exchange controls as well as periods in which the exchange market is unified. When exchange controls are in place, the nominal price of foreign exchange is set by the authorities, and access to foreign exchange is determined by quantitative rationing. Hence, the official real exchange rate during periods of exchange control is likely to be more appreciated than the equilibrium real rate. It may be more appropriate to use the RER averaged over periods of unified exchange markets-that is, e u -as a proxy for the long-run equilibrium RER.
For the whole sample, the parallel rate is, on average, more depreciated than the unified official RER; as indicated in column 8, the mean of the ratio, e p /e u , is 1.43 for all countries. However, this result masks strong differences between Latin America and Turkey, with a mean of 1.58, and Africa and South Asia, with a mean value of 1.05 (which is not significantly different from 1). Hence, to the extent that e u is a good proxy for the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, e p appears, on average, to have been close to the long-run equilibrium exchange rate in Africa and South Asia, but much more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium level in Latin America and Turkey. This may seem surprising, given the far higher average parallel premiums that have been observed in much of Africa; as shown in column 7, the ratio of the parallel market rate to the official rate during periods of exchange control averaged 1.85 for Africa and South Asia but only 1.42 for Latin America and Turkey.
The strong differences in e p /e u , the ratio of the parallel rate to the unified official rate, between Latin America and Africa appear to be related to equally marked differences in the evolution of the official exchange rate between the two regions. As indicated in column 9, in Latin America and Turkey, the real official exchange rate tended to be more depreciated during periods of exchange controls than during periods in which the exchange markets were unified; the mean ratio of e nu /e u was 1.12, with 9 of the 12 countries having ratios greater than 1. This is consistent with our view that in Latin America and Turkey, unsustainable policies resulted in macroeconomic disequilibrium, which, in turn, triggered capital outflows that depreciated the short-run equilibrium real exchange rate (a relationship that would hold in a unified exchange market) relative to its long-run level. The government did depreciate the official exchange rate, but not by as much as the short-run equilibrium rate depreciated. Therefore, an excess demand for foreign exchange developed, causing the parallel rate to depreciate as well. As macroeconomic pressures eased, capital outflows moderated and reversed themselves, leading to an appreciation of the short-run equilibrium exchange rate and facilitating the unification of exchange markets.
In contrast to Latin America and Turkey, in the African and South Asian countries in our sample, the real official exchange rate tended to be more appreciated when exchange controls were in place than when exchange markets were unified. As shown in column 9, for Africa and South Asia, the ratio of e nu /e u was only .65, with all five countries in this grouping showing ratios less than 1. This evidence, while qualified by the low number of observations in the subsample, supports our speculation that the emergence of a parallel market in Africa and South Asia was typically the result of an appreciation of the real official exchange rate relative to the long-run equilibrium rate. Authorities chose, for a variety of reasons, to ration foreign exchange while maintaining an overvalued real exchange rate. As the extent of overvaluation increased, often foreign exchange rationing tightened, and the parallel market grew, as did the premium.
Considering how overvalued the real official exchange rate was in the South Asian and many African countries, relative to its long-run equilibrium value, it is surprising that parallel rates in those countries were not more depreciated compared with average official exchange rates during the periods when exchange markets were unified. The subsection above on the equilibrium parallel market rate showed that, all else being equal, the more overvalued was the official exchange rate, the more undervalued would be the parallel rate relative to the long-run equilibrium rate. Therefore, unification presumably would have required African and South Asian governments to devalue their official exchange rates to a level that was not as depreciated as the prior level of the parallel rate.
In addressing this issue, it is important to point out that we have a very small sample to examine-only five countries in our sample in the subset consisting of Africa and South Asia unified their exchange rates. In two of these five cases (Egypt and Tanzania), the ratio is greater than 1. Additionally, as pointed out earlier in the discussion of the equilibrium parallel market rate, there are factors that may lower the parallel rate relative to the level predicted by the basic model. First, consider the case when underinvoicing, f, is high because exchange controls are not effective because enforcement is lackadaisical and evasion widespread. Then, for all practical purposes, the relevant rate for the economy becomes the parallel rate, which may, in this case, be close to the equilibrium rate. Thus, when exchange markets are unified, the official rate would need to be depreciated to the level of the former parallel rate, and e p /e u would be close to one. Ghana is an excellent illustration of this possibility (Chhibber and Shaffik 1991) .
A second factor that might appreciate the parallel market rate relative to the level predicted by the basic model might be the strong enforcement of import controls. This would cause the premium to be low, even if the official exchange rate is maintained at a substantially overvalued level compared with the long-run equilibrium exchange rate, since effective import controls reduce the demand for foreign exchange and thereby appreciate the short-run equilibrium exchange rate. Then, if unification is associated with import liberalization, thereby depreciating the short-run real equilibrium exchange rate, the official exchange rate will have to depreciate by a large amount if excess demands for foreign exchange are to be eliminated. This scenario would lead to a ratio, e p /e u , that would be low compared with the predictions of the basic model outlined in the subsection on the equilibrium parallel market rate. India is the best example of this scenario: unification of the exchange rate took place in 1993 as part of a larger liberalization effort, requiring a greater devaluation of the official exchange rate than would have been the case in the absence of import liberalization.
The Official Exchange Rate after Exchange Market Unification
The issues related to unification can be further examined by considering what happens to the official exchange rate at that time. We have 20 observations of unifications. In some cases, a country has two episodes of dual exchange rates, with a period of unified exchange rates in the interim; these are treated as two separate observations. Some countries have never unified, and therefore are not represented (see the appendix for the complete list). The composition of the unification data set is quite different from that used in table 12.1. First, three-quarters of the observations are from the experience of unification in Latin America; only 3 out of the 20 observations are for Africa, with the 2 South Asian countries completing the count. The small sample means that the subset results are to be interpreted with caution for the Africa and South Asia subset.
In table 12.4, we look at the mean, median, and standard deviation of three variables: the average official RER for the year before the unification (column 10), the average official RER in the year following unification (column 11), and the average parallel rate for the year preceding the unification (column 12). We calculate two ratios of the postunification official RER to the preunification RER, e 
Summary and Conclusions
This section now summarizes the most important findings presented in this chapter. To begin with, our theoretical analysis indicated that when the emergence of a parallel exchange market is motivated by the overvaluation of the official exchange rate relative to the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, the parallel market rate is likely, on average, to be more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. The gap between the parallel rate and the long-run equilibrium rate is likely to be smaller to the extent that export receipt surrender requirements are not well enforced and to the extent that barriers to imports and other commercial policies that tend to appreciate the short-run equilibrium real exchange rate are well enforced. Moreover, our theoretical analysis indicated that even if the official exchange rate is set at its long-run equilibrium level, a parallel market may arise in order to meet the demands of residents seeking to augment their holdings of foreign assets. During the period in which foreign assets are being accumulated-that is, when capital flight is occurringthe parallel exchange rate will be more depreciated than its own equilibrium value, and hence probably more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium exchange rate for the economy as a whole. Additionally, because the parallel market rate is an asset price, and exhibits the volatility that is characteristic of all asset prices, the value of the parallel rate at any given moment is likely to be a particularly poor indicator of the long-run equilibrium exchange rate.
These considerations suggest that on balance, the parallel rate is likely to be more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, and hence the official exchange rate in a unified exchange market will in general best be set at a level that is more appreciated than the prior parallel rate (averaged over a suitably long period).
In this chapter, we did not compare actual parallel exchange rates to estimates of the long-run equilibrium rate in different countries, owing to the difficulty of estimating equilibrium rates for a large sample. However, we compared multiyear averages of real parallel rates to real official rates in a sample of 24 developing countries and made a number of empirical observations. First, we found that for the sample as a whole, the real parallel market rate was generally more depreciated than the official exchange rate, even when the official rate was measured only during periods in which the exchange markets were unified. During periods in which the exchange market is unified and there are no exchange controls to bridge the gap between supplies and demands for foreign exchange, the official exchange rate is more likely to be close to the long-run equilibrium rate on average. Hence, these two observations constitute partial evi-dence that the parallel rate tends to be undervalued relative to the longrun equilibrium exchange rate.
Second, we found important differences in the relationship between parallel and official exchange rates among different subsets of our country sample. In Latin America and in Turkey, the emergence of parallel exchange markets appears to have reflected a sharp depreciation of the short-run equilibrium exchange rate relative to its long-run value, not the appreciation of the official exchange rate from its long-run equilibrium value. In those countries, the parallel rate was clearly depreciated compared with the official exchange rate during periods in which the exchange markets were unified. However, the undervalued nature of the parallel rate does not appear to have reflected the overvaluation of the official exchange rate relative to the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate during periods of exchange controls, since the official exchange rate in this subset was on average more depreciated during the periods in which exchange controls were in effect than in the periods in which markets were unified.
We surmise that a combination of internal and external shocks led to macroeconomic turbulence and capital flight in Latin America and Turkey, mainly in the 1980s. These developments, in turn, depreciated the short-run equilibrium real exchange rate relative to its long-run level. While the authorities depreciated their official exchange rates-possibly even to levels more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium ratethey did not do so by enough to resolve excess demands for foreign exchange. That is, even if official exchange rates during the exchange control period were undervalued relative to the long-run equilibrium rate, they were overvalued relative to the short-run equilibrium rate, thereby giving rise to parallel exchange markets. As a result, the parallel rates probably were even more undervalued relative to the long-run equilibrium rate than were the official rates. 20 Third, we found that the African and South Asian countries in our sample better fit our preconception that the emergence of parallel exchange markets reflects the overvaluation of the official exchange rate relative to its long-run equilibrium value. Among the few countries in this subset that experienced periods of unified exchange rates, the real official exchange rate clearly was more appreciated during periods in which exchange controls were in effect than in periods in which exchange markets were unified. This suggests that in contrast to the Latin America and Turkey case, the real appreciation of official exchange rates in Africa and South Asia, relative to long-run equilibrium values, was the main factor underlying the emergence of parallel markets.
However, in Africa and South Asia, the parallel exchange rate was not significantly more depreciated than the official exchange rate during periods in which markets were unified-put another way, when exchange markets were unified, the authorities had to depreciate the official rate all the way to the level of the former parallel rate. The relative similarity of parallel and unified official exchange rates underscores the fact that in the case of some African countries, exchange controls may have been so poorly enforced that the parallel rate effectively mimicked the role of the official rate in a unified exchange market. Additionally, in some Asian countries, well-enforced import barriers constrained the demand for foreign exchange when exchange controls were in effect, thereby appreciating both the short-run equilibrium exchange rate and the parallel rate; exchange markets were unified at about the same time as import barriers were lowered, making it necessary to depreciate the official exchange rate substantially in order to maintain the balance of payments in a unified market.
Our findings for some African and South Asian countries suggest that in some cases, the parallel rate might indeed be reasonably close to the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate that would prevail in a unified market. However, this finding cannot be relied upon to support the use of the parallel rate as a proxy for the long-run equilibrium unified rate more generally because somewhat special factors were operative in these countries-specifically, very poorly enforced exchange controls in some African countries, and very well-enforced import controls in some South Asian countries. More generally, the parallel market rate would seem to represent an upper bound, in terms of local currency per dollar, on the appropriate level of the unified official exchange rate.
In order to simplify the calculations, the empirical analysis in this chapter was carried out with bilateral RERs computed using the U.S. producer price index as a proxy for world prices. This procedure may bias the results, particularly for time periods in which movements in the U.S. real exchange rate diverge significantly from those of other industrial countries, as they did over much of the 1980s. We estimate the same ratios as in table 12.3, using trade-weighted multilateral real exchange rates (see tables 12.A.1 and 12.A.2 below).
Data were available in the International Financial Statistics database of the IMF for only 10 of the 24 countries in our sample, for the time period of 1979-94. While it would be possible to calculate multilateral real exchange rates for all the countries in the sample, for the period under consideration this computation would be a laborious process. Further, this data set covers a shorter time period than the one used in the study (1970 to 1994) . However, the real U.S. dollar bilateral rate would have diverged significantly from the trade-weighted multilateral rate primarily in the 1980s; this data set includes the period of interest. Therefore we use the smaller readily available data set to compare the values obtained for the ratios we calculate using the bilateral real exchange rate with those for available trade-weighted, multilateral real exchange rates.
The use of multilateral exchange rates yields estimates of the ratios under consideration that are remarkably similar to those obtained using bilateral results. The one result that is different is the binomial sign test for the ratio e nu /e u . The probability that H 0 is true is much higher when the multilateral rate is used. This is probably due to the very small sample: just five observations. The orders of magnitude do not differ markedly for the measures of central tendency. The choice of a bilateral real exchange rate would not seem to affect the results in any significant way. At the same time, using the bilateral real exchange rate has other advantages. In particular, using the bilateral rate permits analysis for a larger sample of countries for a longer time period. However, there are some instances in which the differences in the values using the different real exchange rates are more than trivial (see table 12.A.2, particularly Uruguay and Nigeria (columns 8 and 9). If the analysis is to be done for a single country, the use of the tradeweighted multilateral real exchange rate would be preferable. For a sample as large as the one in this study, the computational advantages of using the bilateral real exchange rate are greater.
